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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brad Reed was initially a suspect in a burglary investigation, and an officer began to
search his van, pursuant to his consent. When Mr. Reed revoked his initial consent, the officers
began to investigate Mr. Reed for drug or other criminal activity. Methamphetamine was located
after a drug dog sniffed Mr. Reed’s van. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, a
jury convicted him of one count of possession of methamphetamine.
Mr. Reed asserts the district court erred in denying his suppression motion where his
detention was unlawfully extended. He was detained beyond the time reasonably necessary to
conduct the burglary investigation, and for the officers to conduct an investigation into drug
activity or other criminal activity; the stop was prolonged which allowed the drug detection dog
to arrive and conduct a sniff search of Mr. Reed’s van.
Mr. Reed also contends there were a number of trial errors. In what appears to be an
issue of first impression in Idaho, Mr. Reed first asserts that the district court violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by admitting testimony as to Mr. Reed’s “demeanor” and profane language in
revoking his consent to a search of his van. Second, he asserts that the district court erred by
denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor told the jury information the court had
previously ruled inadmissible, and that the prosecutor’s actions constituted misconduct. Third,
he asserts that the prosecutor twice committed misconduct rising to the level of fundamental
error during closing arguments. Initially, the prosecutor used inflammatory language calculated
to appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury by demeaning and impugning defense
counsel’s arguments. The prosecutor claimed that Mr. Reed was faking his injuries in an attempt
to gain the juror’s sympathy; however, the prosecutor knew the injuries were real—he had
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information from the officers at the scene which supported Mr. Reed’s testimony regarding his
disabilities/injuries—thus the prosecutor’s arguments misrepresented the evidence.

This

misconduct denied Mr. Reed his constitutional right to a fair trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 4, 2017, shortly before midnight, someone reported possible criminal activity in
the alley by his house. (Trial Tr.,1 p.17, Ls.20-25.) He reported that there were two vehicles in
the alley and he saw flashlights shining into his fenced yard and overheard someone say
something about grabbing a gas can. (Trial Tr., p.20, L.25 – p.21, L.7.) He told the officers
there was nothing missing from his back yard; however, he was concerned that his neighbor’s
gas can had been taken. (Trial Tr., p.21, Ls.5-7.) One of the vehicles, a green van, was stopped
by law enforcement as it re-entered the alley. (Trial Tr., p.21, Ls.8-21) Brad Reed was driving
the van. (Trial Tr., p.21, Ls.22-23.)
Mr. Reed was cooperative with the officers, and explained to them that he lived in a
house bordering the same alley and that he and two friends had been in the alley, working on the
friend’s car that was having fuel pump problems. (Trial Tr., p.29, Ls.3-17; State’s Exhs. 1, 3.)
Mr. Reed’s story about the broken fuel pump was consistent with those of the passenger and the
driver of the Jeep with the broken fuel pump. (Trial Tr., p.38, Ls.1-5.) Mr. Reed answered the
officers’ questions about what he was doing in the alley by his house and, after arguing with
them as to how they could find stolen items in his van when nothing was stolen, eventually gave

Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, for ease of
reference, citations made herein to the primary volume of transcripts for the trial and sentencing
proceedings in this case are referred to herein as “Trial Tr.” All other citations to the transcripts
are made in accordance with the date of the proceeding transcribed.
1

2

the officers permission to look inside his van for stolen items. (Trial Tr., p.23, Ls.12-20; State’s
Exh.1.)
Mr. Reed was clearly disabled, when taken out of the van he needed assistance to stand—
he wore only one shoe, and stood on one foot as the other had severe neuropathy. (Trial
Tr., p.23, Ls.1-7; State’s Exh. 3, 7:36-7:40.) Nevertheless, as directed to by the officers, he
hobbled to lean against the other car while Officer Caldwell looked inside his van. (State’s Exh.
3, 9:33-9:50.)
When Mr. Reed saw Officer Caldwell2 begin the search by first rifling through his
glovebox and looking under the passenger’s seat, he became upset and revoked his consent to
search the van.

(Trial Tr., p.23, Ls.14-20; State’s Exh. 3; 14:40.)

When he did, Officer

Smotherman questioned him about whether he had any “illegal drugs” in the van, asked why he
wouldn’t let him search the van, and threatened to call for a drug dog. (Trial Tr., p.23, L.24 –
p.24, L.5.) Mr. Reed continued to refuse consent to search his van. (Trial Tr., p.7, L.18 – p.8,
L.2, p.16, L.3 – p.18, L.7; State’s Exh. 3.) After badgering Mr. Reed for over a minute, Officer
Smotherman called for a drug dog, then went back to the reporting neighbor’s house to reconfirm that there had been nothing taken from the neighbor. (Trial Tr., p.26, L.5 – p.27, L.7;
State’s Exh.1.) During the five to seven minutes he was gone, the K-9 arrived and when the dog
was run around the exterior of the van, it alerted. (Trial Tr., p.26, Ls.5-19.) Officer Smotherman
returned to the van just after the dog alerted. (Trial Tr., p.25, Ls.1-3.) After a search of the van,
a baggie containing methamphetamine was located under the driver’s seat. (Trial Tr., p.24,
Ls.13-23.)

2

Officer Caldwell was a new police officer, who had been working for the police department for
just over six months. (Trial Tr., p.16, Ls.10-18.)
3

Based on these facts, the State filed an Information alleging Mr. Reed committed the
crime of possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.59-61.) Thereafter, Mr. Reed filed a Motion
to Suppress and Memorandum in Support. (R., pp.87-92.) He asserted the baggie should be
suppressed on several bases, including that his detention was unlawfully prolonged for 20
minutes after the police had been informed by the reporting parties in order to allow time for the
drug dog to arrive. (R., pp.87-92.)
A hearing was held on Mr. Reed’s motion to suppress. (R., p.99; Trial Tr., p.5, L.6 –
p.82, L.15.) Mr. Reed asserted that the officers unreasonably delayed Mr. Reed’s detention to
allow the drug dog time to arrive. (Trial Tr., p.12, Ls.5-7.) Mr. Reed claimed that the officers’
efforts to obtain consent to search constituted unrelated inquires which measurably extended the
duration of the stop. (Trial Tr., p.76, Ls.11-22.)
The district court issued a memorandum opinion in which it made the following factual
findings:
1. On July 4, 2016, at approximately 11:39 p.m., law enforcement responded to a
citizen’s report of a suspected burglary in progress in the public alleyway by his house
in Twin Falls, Idaho.
2. Officer Smotherman arrived at 11:39 p.m., and immediately detained and handcuffed
the driver of a white Jeep identified by the reporting party as being involved in the
possible burglary.
3. Officer Caldwell arrived at 11:40 and he and Officer Smotherman went to speak to the
reporting party at his house.
4. The reporting party said he heard the gate in his backyard rattle, saw flashlights
shining into his backyard, and saw someone take a gas can from the garage of a
neighbor who also faced the alley. The reporting party said he did not see anything
taken from his own property.
5. The reporting party said two vehicles were involved—a white Jeep and a green van
with two occupants.
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6. While speaking with the reporting party, the officers saw a green van with two
occupants drive into the alley. Both officers went to the alley to detain and question
the driver, Brad Reed, and his male passenger.
7. They handcuffed and frisked both men, and reported “two more” detained at 11:51
p.m.
8. Officer Smotherman asked Mr. Reed for permission to search the van for any stolen
property and Mr. Reed consented.
9. Officer Caldwell began the search by looking in the glove compartment and under the
passenger seat of the van. Mr. Reed became belligerent, and, using profanity, revoked
his consent. According to the officers, Mr. Reed also became increasingly nervous.
10. At 12:04 a.m., Officer Smotherman returned to the van, to Mr. Reed objecting to the
search.
11. At 12:06 a.m., Officer Smotherman became suspicious of drug activity and requested
a K-9 unit. While waiting for the K-9 to arrive, Officer Smotherman continued to ask
Mr. Reed for permission to search the van, asking him if there was anything illegal
such as drugs in the van. This questioning went on for one minute until Officer
Smotherman left to return to the reporting party’s residence.
12. After speaking further with the reporting party, Officer Smotherman concluded that
no criminal conduct had occurred. Officer Smotherman finished his conversation
between 12:16 and 12:17 a.m.
13. While Officer Smotherman was speaking with the reporting party, the drug dog
arrived and alerted on the van. It was searched and Mr. Reed was charged with
possession of methamphetamine.
(R., pp.100-03.)3 The district court found that the consent to search was for any stolen property;
therefore, the officers were not required to limit their search to only the areas of the van
containing a gas can. (R., pp.104-05.) Further, no contraband was found during this consentedto search. (R., p.105.) The court found that after Officer Smotherman obtained consent to
search the van, he checked the identification and licenses of the three suspects, and, after
Mr. Reed revoked his consent, Officer Smotherman “spent a couple of minutes dealing with

3

These findings have been paraphrased and are presented as individually numbered findings for
enhanced readability.
5

Reed’s objection and trying to regain consent to search the van—this time for anything illegal
including drugs.” (R., p.105.) The district court found that checks of identification and driver’s
licenses, as well as brief and general questions about drugs and weapons, are permissible when
performing a traffic stop. (R., p.105.)
The district court found that when Mr. Reed revoked his consent and Officer
Smotherman returned to the van to determine the cause of Mr. Reed’s profane outburst, their
exchange was still related to the burglary investigation in that it dealt with the search for stolen
items that Mr. Reed had given as part of the burglary investigation. (R., p.107.)
However, after Smotherman called for the K-9 unit he again attempted to regain
consent to search—this time for anything illegal, such as drugs. This attempt
extended the stop for about a minute of time. However, the context in which it
occurred convinces the Court that it was supported by reasonable suspicion.
(R., p.107.) The district court wrote that the factors relevant to this finding were:
First, the officers had responded to a call about suspicious activity in an alley in
the middle of the night on a holiday. Although that initial call was regarding a
burglary in progress, Smotherman was not required to blind himself to the
possibility that other criminal conduct besides a burglary could be afoot under
those circumstances. Added to the time and location of the suspicious activity
was the manner in which Reed revoked his consent after Caldwell had already
searched the passenger area of the vehicle. Reed’s marked change in behavior
from relatively cooperative to profane and belligerent is an important factor
supporting an expansion of the search for additional criminal activity, including
illicit drugs. The officers were entitled to make inferences from Reed’s drastic
change in behavior when Caldwell began the search to which Reed had moments
before consented. One of the inferences Smotherman made was that Reed was
hiding something illegal.
(R., pp.107-108.) Although the district court recognized that a defendant’s nervousness does not
necessarily give rise to reasonable suspicion, the court distinguished this case from the facts in
State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919 (Ct. App. 2016), finding that Mr. Reed was not merely nervous like
the Neal defendant, but he first consented to a search of his van, then quickly became belligerent
and began a profane outburst while revoking consent. (R., pp.106, 108.) “It is this drastic
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change in behavior that the Court finds significant—not his mere revocation of consent, which
was his right.” (R., p.108.) The court noted that Neal suggested that the time of day is of little
significance, but then found Neal distinguishable because, in Mr. Reed’s case, the officers
viewed the time of day as significant because it was just around midnight on the Fourth of July
and, with people away from their homes, the officers believed that there were greater
opportunities for criminal conduct. (R., p.108.) The court concluded that these factors provided
Officer Smotherman with reasonable suspicion to investigate possible drug activity and to
attempt to expand the scope of Mr. Reed’s consent to include a search for “anything illegal.”
(R., p.108.)
The district court found that the entire sniff search was conducted when Officer
Smotherman was still with the reporting party and therefore still conducting his burglary
investigation. (R., p.109.) It found that the time devoted to the sniff search was concurrent with
the burglary investigation and added nothing to the length of the stop. (R., p.109.) The district
court ultimately denied Mr. Reed’s motion to suppress, finding that the initial stop was lawful
and the investigatory detention was not unlawfully extended. (R., pp.100-09.)
Before trial, defense counsel moved to prohibit the admission of testimony or evidence
that Mr. Reed re-invoked his Fourth Amendment rights after his initial consent to the search of
his van. (Trial Tr., p.151, L.8 – p.152, L.6.) The district court granted the motion; however, in
closing arguments the prosecutor told the jury that Mr. Reed tried to stop the officers from
searching his van after they started to search and that he objected to the officers searching. (Trial
Tr., p.265, Ls.920; p.276, Ls.3-9.)

The district court denied defense counsel’s subsequent

motion for a mistrial. (Trial Tr., p.265, Ls.19-20.) Later, during his closing remarks, the
prosecutor implied that Mr. Reed was only faking his disabilities for the purpose of garnering

7

sympathy with the jury, despite having additional information that the disabilities were
legitimate. (Trial Tr., p.275, L.21 – p.276, L.2.)
After the jury trial, Mr. Reed was found guilty as charged. (R., p.161.) The district court
sentenced him to a unified term of seven years, with six months fixed. (7/17/17 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-7;
R., pp.179-84.) Mr. Reed filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.189-93, 204-09.)

8

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Reed’s motion to suppress?

II.

Did the district court violate Mr. Reed’s constitutional rights by admitting evidence of his
revocation of consent to search his van?

III.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Reed’s motion for a mistrial?

IV.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in its closing arguments?

9

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Reed’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court found that the stop was extended for several minutes unrelated to the

burglary investigation. During that time, Officer Smotherman sought Mr. Reed’s permission to
search his van for “anything illegal.” The district court found that the scope and duration of the
stop was not illegally extended, because at the time of the extension, Officer Smotherman had
developed reasonable and articulable suspicion of drug or other criminal activity.
Mr. Reed asserts that the length of his detention was impermissibly extended to conduct
an investigation of drug or other criminal activity which was unsupported by reasonable
suspicion, which, in turn, allowed a drug dog time to arrive and to sniff the exterior of his van.
Mr. Reed’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, protected by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated. Therefore, the district court erred in
denying Mr. Reed’s motion to suppress.
B.

Standards Of Review
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches

and seizures. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and thus, violations of the Fourth
Amendment.

State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288 (1995). However, the State may rebut this

presumption by establishing that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized
exception to the warrant requirement, or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.
Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290. If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the
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warrant requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as
the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, Idaho appellate courts
apply a bifurcated standard of review: the Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact,
unless they are clearly erroneous, but the Court will freely review the trial court's application of
constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009). “The
Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.” State v.
Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005).
C.

The Duration Of The Traffic Stop Was Unlawfully Extended When The Officers Ceased
Investigating A Possible Burglary, Began A Drug Investigation, And Called For The
Drug Detection Dog
Mr. Reed concedes that the initial stop was lawful, however, he asserts that the stop was

unlawfully extended when the officers sought consent to search his van for “anything illegal” as
that type of investigation was unrelated to the burglary investigation.

The detention was

unlawfully extended while the officers pursued a drug investigation or investigation into other
criminal activity, and called for a drug detection dog.
Because the officers were looking for a missing gas can, they were delaying the stop by
badegering Mr. Reed to allow a search of his van for “anything illegal,” and they did not have
reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate a drug investigation, or to take time from the burglary
investigation to call for a drug dog. Therefore, the officers unlawfully detained Mr. Reed beyond
the time necessary to reasonably investigate the burglary call. Because a search of Mr. Reed’s
van for “anything illegal” was not in furtherance of the potential burglary involving only a
(possibly) missing gas can, the stop should have concluded at 12:04 a.m. (See R., p.102.)
However, the officers delayed the stop in violation of Mr. Reed’s constitutional rights until the
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drug dog arrived at 12:09 (Def’s Exh. A, p.2; State’s Exh. 2) and alerted at approximately 12:14
(State’s Exh. 2, 5:00).
“The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law
enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect.”
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). “[A]n investigative detention must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id. “Similarly, the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to
verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time.” Id. (citations omitted).
A citizen “may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds
for doing so.” State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651-52 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Royer, 460 U.S.
at 498, 500). Furthermore, although the stop of the vehicle may be of short duration, if the
continued detention of the driver unreasonably extends beyond the length necessary for the
purpose of the stop, the continued detention of the driver without any reasonable suspicion to
support such inquiry is violative of the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 652.
The determination of whether an investigative detention is reasonable requires a two-part
inquiry—whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably
related in scope of the circumstances justifying the interference in the first place. State v. Roe,
140 Idaho 176, 181 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361 (Ct. App. 2000).
The scope of detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. Roe, 140 Idaho
at 181; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361. The reviewing court must also examine the intensity of the
detention, as well as its duration. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181. Brief, unrelated inquiries do not
necessarily violate a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. “It is the State’s burden to
demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was
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sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.”
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
When gauging whether information known to an officer justified reasonable suspicion,
the reviewing court considers the totality of the circumstances rather than viewing individual
facts in isolation. Roe, 140 Idaho at 180. Even where any individual factor “is not by itself
proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent” conduct, a court may
nonetheless conclude that the factors together amount to reasonable suspicion. United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. United States holds “that a
police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates
the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015). In so
finding, the Rodriguez Court made clear that it was adhering to the line drawn in its prior
decision in Illinois v. Caballes. Id; see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that a
lawful seizure justified only by a traffic violation becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete the purpose of issuing a ticket for the violation).
In analyzing the issue, the Rodriguez Court explained: “Like a Terry stop,[4] the tolerable
duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—
to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.”
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1611. (internal citations omitted). The Court reiterated that “[b]ecause
addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, [the detention] may ‘last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the
infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. at 1614. (internal citations

4

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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omitted). The Court recognized that an officer “may conduct certain unrelated checks during an
otherwise lawful stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop absent the
reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.”

Id. at 1615.

(internal citations omitted).
Mr. Reed asserts the duration of the investigatory stop was unlawfully extended.
(R., pp.87-92.) The delay in this case was threefold—the officers deviated from the burglary
investigation to search the van for “anything stolen,” the officers prolonged the stop to ask about
drugs and for consent to search for “anything illegal,” and the officers further prolonged the stop
to call for a drug detection dog. However, the officers’ detour into a drug investigation was
based on nothing more than a hunch—a hunch based on Mr. Reed’s assertion of his
constitutional right.
The district court found that for “approximately three minutes—the focus of the
investigation shifted to include a search for drugs. To whatever extent this time could be
considered an extension of the burglary investigation, the Court finds it was both reasonably
related to the burglary investigation and/or supported by reasonable suspicion.” (R., p.106.) The
court held that the officers were acting within the scope of Mr. Reed’s consent when Officer
Caldwell conducted the initial search of the glovebox and the area under the passenger’s seat,
and when Mr. Reed revoked his consent, Officer Smotherman’s questioning of why he revoked
consent and the officers’ attempts to regain consent were “still related to the burglary
investigation, insofar as it had to do with the [consent to] search for stolen items that Reed had
initially given as part of the burglary investigation.” (R., p.107) (emphasis in original). “[A]fter
Smotherman called for the K-9 unit he again attempted to regain consent to search—this time for
anything illegal, such as drugs. This attempt extended the stop for about a minute of time.”
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(R., p.107.) However, the district court found that “the context in which it occurred convinces
the Court that it was supported by reasonable suspicion.” (R., p.107.) Specifically, the court
found that two factors supported the officer’s reasonable suspicion of drug activity: (1) the time
of day—the officers had responded to a call about suspicious activity in an alley in the middle of
the night on a holiday; and (2) Mr. Reed’s drastic change in behavior when he revoked his
consent—the inference the officers drew from Mr. Reed’s change in behavior was that he was
hiding criminal activity. (R., pp.107-08, 107 n.3.)
Mr. Reed challenges the district court’s finding that Officer Smotherman’s return to the
van to determine the cause of Mr. Reed’s profane outburst was initially still related to the
burglary investigation. (R., p.107.) Mr. Reed also challenges the district court’s finding that
Officer Smotherman had reasonable articulable suspicion of drug or other general criminal
activity. (R., p.107.)
1.

There Was No Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Of Drug Or Any Other Criminal
Activity

The district court found that, after Officer Smotherman called for the K-9, he had
reasonable articulable suspicion of drug activity. (R., p.107.) The district court found that:
[A]fter Smotherman called for the K-9 unit he again attempted to regain consent
to search—this time for anything illegal, such as drugs. This attempt extended the
stop for about a minute of time. However, the context in which it occurred
convinces the Court that it was supported by reasonable suspicion.
(R., p.107.) In so concluding, the district court found the factors relevant to this finding were:
(1) the time of day—“the officers had responded to a call about suspicious activity in an alley in
the middle of the night on a holiday”; and (2) Mr. Reed’s drastic change in behavior when he
revoked his consent—officers inferred from Mr. Reed’s change in behavior was that he was
hiding criminal activity. (R., pp.107-08, 107 n.3.) However, these two factors do not support a
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finding of reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. These two factors describe only
a hunch.
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013)
(quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). “[A]n officer may take into account his
experience and law enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered,” Danney,
153 Idaho at 410, but “[t]he officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an
‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989); accord Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112. “The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” Morgan, 154
Idaho at 112.
a.

The Time Of Day And/Or The Fact That It Was A Holiday Does Not Give
Rise To Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity

The district court found that the time of day and the fact that it was a holiday was one of
the two factors establishing reasonable suspicion of drug or criminal activity; however this
conclusion is contradicted by precedent. (R., p.107.) In State v. Neal, the Idaho Court of
Appeals concluded that the defendant’s nervousness, his marijuana t-shirt, the early morning
hour, and his refusal to consent to a search of his vehicle did not support a finding of reasonable
suspicion to extend the traffic stop. 159 Idaho 919, ___, 367 P.3d 1231, 1237 (Ct. App. 2016).
Although the State pointed out that the district court failed to consider that the events took place
at 12:40 a.m., it failed to explain why this was significant. Neal, at 1236. The Neal Court noted
that the State failed to offer a reason why the time of day helped to establish reasonable
suspicion, and cited its earlier holding in State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664 (Ct. App. 1991), a
case in which the Court held that the time of day is of little significance in determining
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reasonable suspicion. Id. (“[T]he fact that the stop occurred in the early morning hours does not
enhance the suspicious nature of the observation.”) Methamphetamine or other drugs may be
present at all times of day, and holidays are not more likely to cause drug users to have drugs on
their person or in their vehicles. Nor does a holiday, even at midnight, increase the likelihood of
drug or criminal activity.
b.

A Drastic Change In Behavior Or Even A Vociferous And ProfanityLaden Revocation Of Consent To Search Does Not Give Rise To
Reasonable Suspicion Of Drug Or Other Criminal Activity

Even though Mr. Reed was upset when he revoked his consent for the officers to search
his van, such a reaction still does not give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug
activity. Mr. Reed challenges the district court’s finding that Mr. Reed exhibited a “drastic
change in behavior” during the search. (R., p.108.) Mr. Reed was never thrilled that Officer
Caldwell was asking to search his van for “anything stolen,” and that is evidenced by his
reluctant acquiescence to the search. (State’s Exh. 1, 16:35-17:52.) Mr. Reed disputes the
district court’s finding that his change of behavior was “drastic” or that he was “belligerent” with
the officers. (R., pp.102, 108.) Although he revoked his consent once he saw Officer Caldwell
begin by searching his glove box, a review of Exhibit 1 makes clear that Mr. Reed only
reluctantly agreed to the search of his van in the first place. (State’s Exh. 1, 16:35-17:52.) For
example, it took a minute and a half before Mr. Reed consented, and, when asked, “Would you
mind if I checked the van for any stolen property?” Mr. Reed responded, “Yeah, I would, cuz
you don’t know what’s stolen.” (State’s Exh, 1, 17:02-17:52.)
Further, even a “drastic change in behavior” including the use of the term “bullshit” does
not give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug or general criminal activity. The district
court found that Mr. “Reed’s marked change in behavior from relatively cooperative to profane
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and belligerent” was an important factor in the officers’ determination that expansion of the
search for additional criminal activity, including illicit drugs, was warranted. (R., p.107.) The
court found “the inference the officers apparently drew from Reed’s change in behavior is simply
that he was hiding criminal activity.” (R., p.107 n.3.) This is the perfect description of a
“hunch.”

The officers here had nothing more than “mere hunch or ‘inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion’” that Mr. Reed was hiding criminal activity. Bishop, 146 Idaho at
811 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)); State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738
(Ct. App. 2005)).
Recently, in Bly, the Court of Appeals held that there was no reasonable suspicion for a
detention where the police officer “articulated no basis justifying why” the defendant’s conduct
was “consistent with criminal activity.” State v. Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 711 (Ct. App. 2016). The
Court of Appeals noted that the officer must be able to articulate something more than “a hunch
based on proximity” or just “strange and suspicious” behavior to support a reasonable inference
that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. Id. at 711. Similar to the
officer’s testimony in Bly, the officers here could not articulate anything other than pure
speculation. The totality of the circumstances does not establish a reasonable suspicion of drug
activity or any criminal activity to prolong the detention. See Neal, 367 P.3d at 1237 (holding
that the driver’s shirt depicting a marijuana leaf, the driver’s nervousness, and the driver’s refusal
to consent to a search of the car, even combined with the officer’s experience that defendant was
engaged in criminal activity, was insufficient to establish reasonable, articulable suspicion of
drug activity).
The district court, in finding that a person’s profane response to law enforcement was a
factor leading to reasonable suspicion, relied on two First Circuit Court of Appeals cases, United
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States v. Soares, 521 F.3d 117, 121 (1st Cir. 2008), and United States v. Rudiaz, 529 F.3d 25, 31
(1st Cir. 2008). (R., p.106.) While cursing was involved in Soares, it was only mentioned in
evaluating the totality of the circumstances—the defendant refused repeated orders to keep still
and keep his hands in sight, used abusive and profane language, and became increasingly
agitated as the stop progressed. However, the issue was whether the officers had reasonable
suspicion to believe the defendant was presently armed and dangerous to justify a pat-frisk for
weapons. In other words, the defendant engaged in erratic and uncooperative behavior which
included cursing at the officers; however, the cursing was not a factor contributing to reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing or drug possession.
In Rudiaz, officers were responding to a 911 call made five minutes prior reporting a
shooting in progress. 529 F.3d at 32. They saw a vehicle matching the report, in the location
described by the report, and saw a man slumped over in the vehicle who was unresponsive to
flashlight beams. Id. When officers inquired as to his welfare, he acted belligerently. Id. The
Court noted that any one of those facts, taken alone, might not have been sufficient to create
reasonable suspicion but that hostile response, combined with the background information
possessed by the officer and his own experience, was sufficient to reasonably suspect the man
was not a victim, but might be a shooter. Id. In that case, the officers had evidence a crime had
been committed, and the defendant’s belligerence provided a clue that he may have been the
assailant. Here, in contrast, there was no independent evidence of drug activity or any other
crime.
In both of the cases cited by the district court, the cursing was only a slight factor
combined with other, more significant factors.

Further, although the district court found

Mr. Reed’s “change in behavior from relatively cooperative to profane and belligerent” was an
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important factor (R., p.107), Mr. Reed was not hostile or aggressive with the officers. He clearly
did not want his van searched, and emphatically told the officers “no” and that his continued
detention was “bullshit” (State’s Exh. 3, 14:05-19:00).
Mr. Reed’s revocation of his previous consent and re-invocation of his Fourth
Amendment Rights cannot give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion of drug activity (or any
other criminal activity). Mr. Reed’s adamant assertion of his constitutional rights does not give
rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain him or to search his entire vehicle for “anything
illegal.” See United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 594 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding defendant’s
refusal of consent, which apparently triggered the officer’s decision to use the drug dog, was
“clearly not an appropriate basis for reasonable suspicion”).
As the Michigan Court of Appeals explained:
Indeed, a suspect may wish to terminate a search in which the scope of
the search envisioned by the police proves to be greater than the scope of
the search to which the suspect intended to consent. For example, a suspect pulled
over for a traffic stop may be willing to consent to a patdown search, but wish to
stop the search when the officers go beyond the patdown search and proceed
to search the vehicle. Similarly, a person may be willing to allow the police into
his house to “look around,” envisioning a brief, cursory inspection by the police,
yet stop the search when it becomes apparent that the search will be detailed and
time consuming. Although these latter two examples may raise questions whether
the police exceeded the scope of consent originally granted, it also seems
reasonable to us that a suspect should be permitted to terminate a search once he
does realize how great a burden the search to which he consented will impose. For
that matter, the suspect may merely realize after the search has begun that
giving consent was ill-advised and that he would be better served to invoke his
constitutional rights and withdraw the consent to search.
People v. Powell, 502 N.W.2d 353, 356–57 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); see United States v.
Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1157 (4th Cir. 1995) (mere assertion of constitutional right to refuse
consent to search does not supply probable cause to search), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1162
(1996); United States v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867, 873 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied,
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499 U.S. 919 (1991); Snow v. State, 578 A.2d 816, 825 (Md. Ct. App. 1990) (driver’s refusal to
consent to search of automobile did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that vehicle contained
narcotics).
Here, Mr. Reed revoked his consent once he observed Officer Caldwell exceeding the
scope of what he believed he consented to—a search for items stolen from a neighbor.5 While
the State has conceded that the search of the glovebox was beyond what Mr. Reed believed was
the scope of consent,6 it gives Mr. Reed a sound and perfectly logical reason to lose his patience
with the officer and revoke his consent.
Even had Mr. Reed revoked his consent vociferously and aggressively, which is
contested, given he was only standing firm to his constitutional right after continued police
pressure, such still does not give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion of drug or other criminal
activity. At best, the officers had a hunch that Mr. Reed might have something he did not want
them to see. A vigorous and profane revocation of consent to search, even combined with the
time of day (although, like Neal, the court has offered no reason why the time of day or the fact
that it was a holiday would mean it was more likely that Mr. Reed had drugs in his vehicle), is
still insufficient to establish reasonable, articulable suspicion.

5

The scope of consent is governed by “objective” reasonableness, i.e., “what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?”
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
6
The prosecutor acknowledged that Mr. Reed did not know he was consenting to a search of
everything. In his closing remarks, the prosecutor said, “the defendant snapped because, after
seeing Officer Caldwell search under that passenger seat, they’re not searching for a gas can or
anything like that, he’s looking for everything.” (Trial Tr., p.261, Ls.16-19.)
21

D.

The Duration Of The Traffic Stop Was Unlawfully Extended For Activities Unrelated To
The Burglary Investigation, Including A Drug Investigation And, Absent This Delay, The
Drug Detection Dog Would Not Have Had Sufficient Time To Arrive And Alert On The
Van
Mr. Reed concedes that the initial stop was lawful, however, he asserts that the stop was

unlawfully extended when the officer began to pursue a drug investigation. This delay provided
sufficient time for the drug detection dog to arrive. Not only did officers seek permission to
search for items unrelated to this burglary investigation, Officer Smotherman detoured from the
burglary investigation for “approximately three minutes” while he shifted the focus of the
investigation to include a search for drugs and while he called for a drug dog. (R., pp.106-107.)
Because, as discussed in subsections (C)(1)-(3), Officer Smotherman did not have reasonable,
articulable suspicion for a drug investigation and a search of Mr. Reed’s van for “anything
illegal” was not in furtherance of the burglary involving a missing gas can, the three minutes
delayed the stop, violating Mr. Reed’s constitutional rights.
“A drug dog sniff may be performed during a traffic stop without violating the Fourth
Amendment if the duration of the stop is not extended or if any extension of the stop is justified
by reasonable suspicion.” State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 424 (Ct. App. 2015). However, just as
the officers cannot unjustifiably detain the defendant to allow the dog to arrive and sniff the car,
nor can the dog sniff itself illegally prolong the detention.

As the United States recently

reaffirmed, “[t]he critical question then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before the officer
issues a ticket . . . but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop[.]’”
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616; see also State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 890 (Ct. App. 2008)
(“The [Supreme] Court emphasized that the stop was not lengthened by the use of the dog”)
(discussing the decision in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005)).
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Here, Officer Caldwell testified that, the officers’ first conversation with the neighbor, he
did not hear the neighbor say anything during that would constitute a crime. (Trial Tr., p.20,
L.25 – p.21, L.7.) In fact, he told the officers that there was nothing missing from his back yard;
however, he was concerned that they may have taken his neighbor’s gas can. (Trial Tr., p.21,
Ls.5-7; State’s Exh.1, 0:00-6:47.)

By 11:52, the officers had detained the drivers of both

vehicles identified by the reporting neighbor, and learned from all three individuals that
Mr. Reed lived in one of the houses bordering the alley and was helping a visitor with car
trouble. (Def’s Exh. A; State’s Exhs. 1, 3.) By 12:04 p.m., the officers had been investigating
for 25 minutes what they knew in the first seven minutes was not a crime. (State’s Exh.1, 0:006:47.) And, once they realized there was no crime—that Mr. Reed lived in a house bordering the
alley and was working on a friend’s car in the alley—they should have released Mr. Reed.
Instead of concluding the investigation after “the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop,” Officers Caldwell and Smotherman detoured into a drug or general criminal activity
investigation before Officer Smotherman called for a K-9, then walked back to the reporting
neighbor to have an unnecessary conversation to again confirm that nothing was stolen—
something the officers knew during the first seven minutes of the investigation. (State’s Exh.1,
0:00-6:47.)
After Mr. Reed revoked his consent, for over four minutes, Officers Smotherman and
Caldwell attempted to get Mr. Reed to allow them to search the van for “anything illegal.”
(State’s Exh. 3, 14:56-19:00.) Mr. Reed maintained that it was “bullshit” for the officers to want
to search his van when nothing had been stolen—they were looking for stolen property that
didn’t exist. (State’s Exh. 3, 14:48-16:34.) Mr. Reed asked the officers for a list of the stolen
property and told them to look in the window of the van. (State’s Exh. 3, 15:32-15:43.) The
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officers told Mr. Reed, “You can say that [it is bullshit] as much as you want but we’re just
going to keep you here longer. (State’s Exh. 3, 16:00-16:05.) After telling Mr. Reed that he was
going to go talk to the reporting party again, Officer Smotherman said, “What would really help
me, for sure, is for me to just make sure you don’t have anything illegal. I have to be honest with
you, I think there’s a reason you don’t want me to search your van.”

(State’s Exh. 3, 18:14-

18:35.)
Mr. Reed had been standing on one leg, in handcuffs, for nearly 25 minutes when the
drug dog arrived and indicated on the van. (Def’s Exh. A; State’s Exhs. 1-3.) As soon as they
spoke to the person in the Jeep at 11:41 and the persons in the green van at 11:52, and learned
that Mr. Reed lived in one of the houses bordering the alleyway and had been working on a
vehicle in the alley that night, they should have uncuffed these people and allowed them to leave.
The officers’ unlawful detention of Mr. Reed to request permission to search his van for
“anything illegal,” and the call for the K-9 extended the stop absent reasonable suspicion of drug
or other criminal activity. Where the district court found the officers delayed the burglary
investigation for three minutes (R., p.106), and the drug dog indicated on the van at 12:14
(State’s Exh. 2), and Officer Smotherman was back at the scene to assist in the search at 12:16 to
12:17 (R., p.102), the three minutes the investigation was delayed made the difference in whether
the drug dog had time to conduct the sniff and indicate the presence of drugs. But for the delay,
there would have been insufficient time for the drug dog to arrive and sniff Mr. Reed’s van. A
seizure remains lawful only “so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the
duration of the stop.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2005); see Rodriguez, 135
S. Ct. at 1611.
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The officers’ questioning unlawfully extended the stop absent reasonable suspicion of
drug or any other criminal activity. While certain generalized questions have been allowed as a
matter of routine during traffic stops, such questioning on topics unrelated to the purpose of the
stop is permissible only “so long as [unrelated] inquires do not measurably extend the duration
of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (emphasis added). Here, the district
court measured the time the unrelated inquiries added to the stop and found Officer
Smotherman’s unrelated investigation went on for one to three minutes.7

(R., pp.106-07.)

According to the district court’s calculations, the officer’s unrelated inquires measurably (and
impermissibly) extended the duration of the stop.
Mr. Reed asserts that his continued detention and the eventual search of his van was
unlawful and, thus, violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The discovery of the evidence used against Mr. Reed was the product of his illegal
detention and unlawful search and should have been suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-88 (1963). Therefore, Mr. Reed asserts that
the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress.

7

The district court found that “at some point between when [Smotherman] returned to the van to
deal with Reed’s objection and then returned to the reporting party’s residence—approximately
three minutes—the focus of the investigation shifted to include a search for drugs.” (R., p.106.)
The court later separated the time after the call for the K-9, finding “after Smotherman called for
the K-9 unit he again attempted to regain consent to search—this time for anything illegal, such
as drugs. This attempt extended the stop for about a minute of time.” (R., p.107.)
25

II.
The District Court Violated Mr. Reed’s Constitutional Rights By Admitting Evidence Of
Mr. Reed’s Revocation Of His Consent To Search His Van
A.

Introduction
Prior to trial, defense counsel sought to exclude testimony or evidence that Mr. Reed re-

invoked his Fourth Amendment rights after his initial consent to the search of his van. (Trial
Tr., p.151, L.8 – p.152, L.6.) Although defense counsel argued that all of Mr. Reed’s words and
conduct surrounding the revocation should be excluded, the district court allowed the State’s
witnesses to testify as to Mr. Reed’s “demeanor” when he revoked consent. (Trial Tr., p.164,
Ls.10-24.) Such was error, as the words and conduct of Mr. Reed when revoking consent was as
constitutionally protected as his right to deny consent to search.
B.

Standard Of Review
“When considering alleged violations of constitutional rights, this Court defers to the

district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review over the trial
court’s determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found.” State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 735 (2010).
C.

The District Court Violated Mr. Reed’s Constitutional Rights In Admitting Evidence Of
Mr. Reed’s Demeanor And Language When He Revoked His Consent To A Warrantless
Search Of His Van
Prior to trial, Mr. Reed moved the court to preclude the introduction by the State of

evidence that Mr. Reed consented to a search of his van but then later withdrew that consent,
adamantly. (Trial Tr., p.151, Ls.8-14.) Defense counsel clarified that he was opposed to any
part of the words or conduct by which Mr. Reed revoked his consent coming in:
Your Honor, I don’t think we can separate the issues and say, well, we’re not
going to talk about the fact that you revoked consent, but we’re going to bring in
the anger, profanity. I think it’s all or nothing. The purpose of that evidence is to
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show lack of cooperation, saying I’m going to withdraw my consent. If all we’re
going to say is he swore, he got angry, then I would argue that it’s, apparently,
showing my client is a guy who swears and isn’t very nice. In that case, I think
it’s all or nothing. I don’t know how we would separate the testimony, the
revocation of consent from maybe the profanity or the anger, that sort of thing.
(Trial Tr., p.156, Ls.13-25.)
Initially, the district court correctly ruled that any comment about consent withdrawal or
refusal to consent was not proper to show consciousness of guilt. (Trial Tr., p.163, Ls.18-21.)
However, after it ruled that the State could not make the argument that revocation of consent
shows consciousness of guilt or knowledge (Trial Tr., p.164, Ls.10-13), it appeared to reconsider
whether the revocation of consent could be admissible to show Mr. Reed’s knowledge that there
was methamphetamine under his seat (Trial Tr., p.164, Ls.12-24). The court rationalized, “but I
don’t see that revoking consent shows knowledge. I mean it could. I guess it’s inferential, but
it’s also inferential for conscious of guilt, which is very troubling.” (Trial Tr., p.164, Ls.17-20.)
The court ultimately ruled that the State could ask its witnesses about Mr. Reed’s demeanor after
the passenger seat search. (Trial Tr., p.164, Ls.21-23.)
1.

A Defendant’s Assertion Of His Constitutional Right To Revoke His Consent To
Search Is Inadmissible As Evidence Of Consciousness Of Guilt Or Knowledge

It is well established that a defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent cannot be
used as evidence against him. The United States Supreme Court decisions in Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976), and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), “forbid the government from
pointing to a defendant’s post-arrest silence, or to his invocation of his Fifth Amendment
privilege not to testify, as evidence of his guilt.”
While Doyle involved an exercise of an arrestee’s right to remain silent, federal courts
have extended the reasoning in Doyle to an arrestee’s right to counsel. “The right to counsel is
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included in the Miranda warnings,8 and as such is covered by the implicit assurance that
invocation of the right will carry no penalty.” United States v. Daoud, 741 F.2d 478, 480 (1st
Cir. 1984); United States v. McDonald, 620 F.2d 559, 562–63 (5th Cir. 1980).
It logically follows that, under the Fourth Amendment, the denial or revocation of
consent to search cannot be used as evidence against a defendant. Relying on Griffin and Doyle,
courts in other jurisdictions have held or suggested that the government may not use a
defendant’s refusal to consent to a search of his home as evidence that he knew the search would
produce incriminating evidence. See United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 794 (10th Cir.
1999); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 206–07 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928
(1988); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350–52 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Taxe,
540 F.2d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977); United States v. Turner,
39 M.J. 259, 262 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Palenkas, 933 P.2d 1269 (Ariz.
1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 (1997); State v. Jennings, 430 S.E.2d 188, 200 (N.C.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028 (1993); Simmons v. State, 419 S.E.2d 225, 226–27 (S.C.
1992).
Other jurisdictions have found error in the admission of evidence (including words
uttered accompanying the base denial) of a defendant’s refusal to consent as consciousness of
guilt. See United States v. Moreno, 233 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2000) (the Fourth Amendment
entitled defendant to withhold consent to the search, and so introducing the invocation of that
right as evidence of guilt may have been inconsistent with due process); United States. v. Thame,
846 F.2d 200, 206–07 (3rd Cir. 1988) (error for the prosecutor to argue that the defendant’s
refusal to consent to search of his bag constituted evidence of his guilt); Padgett v. State, 590

8

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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P.2d 432, 434 (Alaska 1979) (right to refuse to consent to warrantless search of car would be
“effectively destroyed if, when exercised, it could be used as evidence of guilt”); State v.
Palenkas, 933 P.2d 1269, 1280, 1282 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (prosecutor’s use of defendant’s
contacting his attorney and his invocation of his right to refuse a warrantless search as evidence
of his guilt denied due process and required a new trial); People v. Wood, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132,
136 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (defendant's invocation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment was
improperly used to demonstrate his consciousness of guilt; however, this error was harmless);
People v. Keener, 195 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (the trial court improperly
admitted evidence of defendant’s refusal to allow police to enter his apartment to show a
consciousness of guilt); Gomez v. State, 572 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. Ct. App.1990) (police officer's
comment on defendant’s refusal to consent to a search without probable cause was constitutional
error); State v. Glover, 89 A.3d 1077, 1082-83 (Maine 2014) (“Although the Fourth Amendment
itself may not prohibit admission of evidence of a defendant’s refusal to consent to a search for
the purpose of proving consciousness of guilt, we conclude that the unfair prejudice that results
from the use of evidence of the refusal for this purpose requires its exclusion, and that this error
is plain.”); People v. Stephens, 349 N.W. 2d 162, 163-64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (the Fourth
Amendment gives the defendant the constitutional right to refuse to consent to a search and the
assertion of that right cannot be evidence of a crime); Ramet v. State, 209 P. 3d 268, 270 (Nev.
2009) (holding officer’s testimony as to defendant’s statements accompanying his refusal to
consent to the search—that it was a “search and seizure issue”—were improperly admitted
because evidence of defendant’s assertion of his Fourth Amendment right cannot be evidence of
his guilt); People v. Pollard, 307 P. 3d 1124, 1128 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that reversal
was required where prosecution improperly elicited evidence of, and commented on, defendant’s
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refusal to consent to a search of his car where prosecutor told jury defendant said, “Nobody's
searching my car,” and, on the second occasion, “I'm not giving you my keys”).
One cannot be penalized for passively asserting the right to refuse consent to enter a
residence, regardless of one’s motivation. Prescott, 581 F.2d at 1351 (holding that defendant’s
refusal to let the police enter her apartment without a warrant was constitutionally protected
conduct which should not have been considered as evidence of the offense charged); see also
Taxe, 540 F.2d at 969. In Prescott, the Ninth Circuit reasoned:
Just as a criminal suspect may validly invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in an
effort to shield himself from criminal liability, so one may withhold consent to a
warrantless search, even though one’s purpose be to conceal evidence of
wrongdoing.
Had Prescott forcibly resisted the entry into her apartment, we might have a
different case. We express no opinion on that question. We only hold that her
passive refusal to consent to a warrantless search is privileged conduct which
cannot be considered as evidence of criminal wrongdoing. If the government
could use such a refusal against the citizen, an unfair and impermissible burden
would be placed upon the assertion of a constitutional right and future consents
would not be “freely and voluntarily given.”
Prescott, at 1351 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). The Court held, “The [Fourth]
Amendment gives him a constitutional right to refuse to consent to entry and search. His
asserting it cannot be a crime[,] [n]or can it be evidence of a crime.” Id. (internal citations and
punctuation omitted). The Court explained its holding:
The right to refuse protects both the innocent and the guilty, and to use its
exercise against the defendant would be, as the Court said in Griffin, a penalty
imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional right.
Because the right to refuse entry when the officer does not have a warrant is
equally available to the innocent and the guilty, just as is the right to remain
silent, the refusal is as “ambiguous” as the silence was held to be in United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1975). Yet use by the prosecutor of the
refusal of entry, like use of the silence by the prosecutor, can have but one
objective to induce the jury to infer guilt. In the case of the silence, the
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prosecutor can argue that if the defendant had nothing to hide, he would not keep
silent. In the case of the refusal of entry, the prosecutor can argue that, if the
defendant were not trying to hide something or someone (in this case Duvernay),
she would have let the officer in. In either case, whether the argument is made or
not, the desired inference may be well drawn by the jury. This is why the
evidence is inadmissible in the case of silence. It is also why the evidence is
inadmissible in the case of refusal to let the officer search.
Prescott, 581 F.2d at 1352 (internal citations omitted). “The value of constitutional privileges is
largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them.” Grunewald v. United States,
353 U.S. 391, 425 (1957) (Black, J., concurring). When faced with this issue, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held:
It would seem . . . illogical to extend protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures, including the obtaining of a warrant prior to implementing a search,
and to also recognize an individual’s right to refuse a warrantless search, yet
allow testimony regarding such an assertion of that right at trial in a manner
suggesting that it is indicative of one’s guilt.
Commonwealth v. Welch, 585 A.2d 517, 519 (Pa. 1991) (holding it was improper to admit
evidence that defendant had refused to consent to search of her bedroom and evidence of her
refusal was not probative of whether the suspect items were present). “Because refusal is
ambiguous, courts have found it unfair to allow a jury to infer guilt from refusal, particularly
when such refusal involves the exercise of a constitutional right.” State v. Baird, 386 P.3d 239,
247 (Wash. 2016).
Here, the district court held that the State could not argue the revocation as evidence of
consciousness of guilt, but allowed testimony on demeanor:
So what this case tells me is that any comment about consent withdrawal or
refusal to consent, which is a Fourth Amendment issue, is not proper for the
purpose of showing consciousness of guilt because it essentially violates the same
principles of Doyle versus Ohio.
The real problem with this case is trying to figure out how to separate any
assertion of the defendant’s constitutional rights to refuse consent from his actual
conduct . . . which I don’t think goes to the issue of a constitutional nature.
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Surely police officer or any witness can testify what they observed about a
defendant’s demeanor.
Where you draw that line in this case is really problematic because I understand
what [defense counsel] is arguing here, that, well, how do you separate those
issues? . . . so my ruling is that the State cannot ask about revocation of consent.
The State cannot make the argument that revocation of consent shows
consciousness of guilt or knowledge.
(Trial Tr., p.163, L.18 – p.164, L.13.)
The district court relied upon State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 470-71 (2007), in
which the Idaho Supreme Court likened the assertion of Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent
offered for the purpose of either impeachment or inferring guilt to the attempt in that case
whereby the State elicited evidence of the defendant’s assertion of Fourth Amendment rights for
the same reasons. In Christiansen, the State conceded that the prosecutor elicited such testimony
for the sole purpose asking the jury to infer the defendant’s guilt. Id. at 469. The Court held that
the prosecutor's questioning regarding the defendant’s refusal to consent to the search of his
business premises when the purpose for such testimony is to show consciousness of guilt was
error, although harmless. Id. at 470-71.
Here, Officer Caldwell testified that he obtained Mr. Reed’s consent to search the van, he
began the search, and once he looked underneath the passenger seat, “Mr. Reed became very
angry. His demeanor changed rapidly, started cursing at us, yelling, screaming, became not as
nice and cordial as he was prior.” (Trial Tr., p.192, L.8 – p.193, L.11.) This led Officer
Caldwell to believe there was something in the van that Mr. Reed did not want them to find. 9

9

The prosecutor also told the jury in his opening remarks that the defendant was pretty
cooperative, but that he turned belligerent when he saw the officer searching underneath the
passenger seat because it “[d]awned on him in his head” that the officer was going to search
under the driver’s seat, where the officer eventually located a baggie of methamphetamine.
(Trial Tr., p.181, L.12 – p.1.)
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(Trial Tr., p.193, Ls.12-15.) Further, the State relied on Mr. Reed’s adamant revocation, his
demeanor, the words he uttered in revoking consent, and his refusal to re-consent to a search of
the van to prove that he knew there was methamphetamine under the driver’s seat of his van.
The prosecutor told the jury:
[T]he repeated objections by the defendant commonsensically say that’s because
he knew meth was under there, his seat.
(Trial Tr., p.275, Ls.4-6.) The district court had previously found (in ruling on Mr. Reed’s
motion to suppress) that Mr. “Reed became belligerent and in a profane outburst clearly and
emphatically revoked his consent.” (R., p.102.) The purported belligerence and profane outburst
were the means by which he expressed his revocation of consent, thus, it was a violation of
Mr. Reed’s constitutional right to allow trial testimony regarding an assertion of his right to
revoke consent to search in a manner suggesting that it is indicative of his guilt. See Welch, 585
A.2d at 519. The district court erred in admitting evidence of Mr. Reed’s assertion of his
constitutional right as evidence of his knowledge and consciousness of guilt.
2.

Evidence Of Revocation Includes Words, Conduct, And Demeanor

Mr. Reed’s demeanor and the language he used to revoke his consent were
constitutionally protected.

“Consent to search may be in the form of words, gestures, or

conduct.” State v. Greub, 162 Idaho 581,___, 401 P.3d 581, 585 (Ct. App. 2017).
Although the district court recognized that Mr. Reed’s Fourth Amendment right was
protected, and thus any comment about his withdrawal of consent or refusal to consent was not
proper to show consciousness of guilt, it nevertheless permitted evidence of demeanor. (Trial
Tr., p.163, Ls.13-22.) The court expressed difficulty
. . . [t]rying to figure out how to separate any assertion of the defendant’s
constitutional rights to refuse consent from his actual conduct . . . which I don’t
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think goes to the issue of a constitutional nature. Surely police officer or any
witness can testify what they observed about a defendant’s demeanor.
(Trial Tr., p.163, L.23 – p.164, L.5.) However, the court’s ruling was erroneous, as demeanor
evidence is misleading without context. Here, Mr. Reed was upset about the search, not upset
generally. Evidence of his demeanor either raises the inference that Mr. Reed invoked his rights
or it is irrelevant and prejudicial.
Whether the demeanor of a defendant as he revokes his initial consent is admissible as
evidence of consciousness of guilt or admissible at all can be compared to the admissibility of a
defendant’s demeanor or language used in the exercise of other constitutional rights.

See

Commonwealth v. Beneche, 933 N.E.2d 951, 963 (Mass. 2010) (officer’s testimony that after
being arrested for murder and read Miranda warnings, the defendant displayed an unemotional
demeanor was improperly admitted as evidence of consciousness of guilt; the defendant’s
demeanor, particularly his lack of emotion, was an element of the fact that he did not respond to
police accusations and was intertwined with his right to remain silent and testimony regarding a
defendant’s statements indicating his intention to remain silent are equally unacceptable); see
also Commonwealth v. Thompson, 725 N.E.2d 556, 565, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 (Mass. 2000)
(testimony regarding “defendant’s action of staring at the floor should not have been admitted for
purposes of proving consciousness of guilt”); Commonwealth v. Harris, 358 N.E.2d 982, 990-91
(Mass. 1976) (defendant’s “hanging his head” and “biting his lips” part of “failure to respond” to
police questioning after arrest were not admissible as “nontestimonial admissions demonstrating
a consciousness of guilt”).
In sum, Mr. Reed’s demeanor as he revoked his previous consent to search was
inextricably tied to his revocation. Mr. Reed did not just say “no” when the officers were
repeatedly asking him for consent to search—he often said “This is bullshit, no” or some
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variation—in response to their questions as to why he wouldn’t grant consent. (State’s Exh. 3,
15:52-16:00 (responding to Officer Smotherman’s question, “Is there a reason specifically you
don’t want me to [search the van]?”, with “This is bullshit.”).) Mr. Reed was not required to
provide a reason for standing on his constitutional right, but his words, exasperation, or
explanations surrounding his revocation of consent and his refusal to renew consent are
intertwined with “no” and cannot be ferreted out and used against him, as evidence of
consciousness of guilt.
In his closing arguments to the jury, the prosecutor focused almost exclusively on
Mr. Reed’s conduct and language surrounding the revocation of his consent to search. The
prosecutor commented on Mr. Reed’s reactions as he revoked consent, telling the jury that
Mr. Reed reacted vulgarly, had a sharp emotion response, snapped, freaked out, got mad, got
really angry, tried to stop the search, got upset, got frustrated, that Mr. Reed’s “actions showed
he knew there was meth in that car,” and his repeated objections were because he knew there was
meth under the seat, (Trial Tr., p.259, Ls.13-14; pp.22-25; p.260, Ls.17-18; p.261, L.16; p.265,
Ls.10-11; Ls.16-17; L.22; p.267, Ls.3-4; p.275, Ls.4-6; p.276, Ls.8-9; p.278, Ls.9-10.)
Admission of the words Mr. Reed used or his demeanor in revoking his consent was
error, and it eviscerated the constitutional right to revoke or deny consent. Future consents will
not be “freely and voluntarily given” if Mr. Reed knows that his words and demeanor in
revoking or denying consent are used as evidence against him. See Prescott, 581 F.2d at 1351.
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III.
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied Mr. Reed’s Motion For A
Mistrial
A.

Introduction
Mr. Reed asserts the district court committed reversible error when it denied his motion

for a mistrial. Despite the district court’s ruling that the State was prohibited from telling the
jury that Mr. Reed invoked his constitutional right to revoke consent to search his van, the State
improperly argued to the jury during closing argument that Mr. Reed’s invocation of his right
was an indicator of his knowledge that there was methamphetamine in his van. In doing so, the
State committed prosecutorial misconduct.
B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1 provides that “[a] mistrial may be declared upon motion of the

defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or
conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the
defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 29.1(a). When there is a motion for mistrial based upon
prosecutorial misconduct supported by a contemporaneous objection to the underlying
procedural or evidentiary error, an appellate court reviews the denial of the motion for mistrial
for reversible error. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made.
Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the ‘abuse
of discretion’ standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is
one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the
incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error.
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Id. (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003)).
C.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Reed’s Motion For A Mistrial After The
Prosecutor Argued To The Jury Information Specifically Prohibited By The District
Court’s Prior Ruling
Mr. Reed asserts, in addition to the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights as argued

in Part II, the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor told the
jury that Mr. Reed tried to stop the search of his van, because the comments were in violation of
the district court’s order granting Mr. Reed’s motion to preclude the introduction of such
evidence. Although defense counsel properly moved for a mistrial, the district court denied the
motion without providing any reasoning.
As Idaho’s appellate courts have held, “[v]iolation of a district court order governing the
presentation of evidence may constitute misconduct.” State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 684
(Ct. App. 2010) (citing Field, 144 Idaho at 572; State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 525 (Ct. App.
2001); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 594-97 (Ct. App. 1995)). For example, in Field, the
district court had previously indicated any testimony regarding a prior investigation of the
defendant might be excluded, and the State therefore promised it would speak with the district
court outside the presence of the jury before referring to an investigation. Field, 144 Idaho at
572. The Idaho Supreme Court in Field accordingly held the State’s questioning of a witness
about the investigation “before discussing it with the judge outside the presence of the jury was
prosecutorial misconduct.”

Id.; see Martinez, 136 Idaho at 525 (holding “the prosecutor

disregarded the district court’s ruling and, therefore, engaged in impermissible prosecutorial
conduct”); Agundis, 127 Idaho at 597 (holding “the prosecutor effectively disregarded the
substance of the district court’s ruling and so crossed the line of permissible conduct”); State v.
Herrera, 159 Idaho 615, 623-24 (2015) (vacating Mr. Herrera’s conviction where the State, in
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violation of the district court’s order, “asked questions that appeared to be deliberately designed
to elicit the exact testimony that the district court had specifically prohibited,” and holding “[a]
party’s deliberate violation of an order excluding evidence with little relevance but with great
potential for prejudice is an attack on the fairness of the proceeding and cannot be
countenanced”).
Here, Mr. Reed moved the court, prior to trial, to preclude the introduction by the State or
its witnesses of evidence that Mr. Reed revoked his consent to search the van. (Trial Tr., p.151,
Ls.8-14.) Defense counsel clarified that he was opposed to any part of the words or conduct by
which Mr. Reed revoked his consent being admitted. (Trial Tr., p.156, Ls.13-25.)
The district court ruled:
[S]o my ruling is that the State cannot ask about revocation of consent. The State
cannot make the argument that revocation of consent shows consciousness of
guilt or knowledge. I don’t – I mean, it’s a different issue, but its essentially one
and the same things, and I understand that’s an element of your case, and you
have to prove that, but I don’t see that revoking consent shows knowledge. I
mean, it could. I guess it’s inferential, but it’s also inferential for consciousness
of guilt, which is very troubling.
I don’t have a problem with the State asking the witness, you know, after the
passenger seat search, what was Mr. Reed’s demeanor, as long as it doesn’t cross
that line. And if he crosses the line, you’re going to get a mistrial. So you’re
going to have to make that call, whether it’s worth it to go down that line, and
you’re going to need to talk to your witness about it. Because if he blurts out
something about revocation of consent, I’ll grant a mistrial.
(Trial Tr., p.164, L.10 – p.165, L.4) (emphasis added).
The law enforcement witness who thereafter testified at trial was careful not to mention
that Mr. Reed revoked his consent, however, during closing arguments, the prosecutor said:
Prosecutor: . . . Here we have somebody who owns the van, who tries to stop the
officers from searching his vehicle only after they started it.
Defense Counsel: I’m going to object, Your Honor. I think that goes directly to
the issue we had about the constitutional right asserted, and I move for mistrial.
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Prosecutor: No. Just gets upset and requires the officer to call in a K9 unit.
The Court: Hang on a minute. Objection’s noted for the record. Motion’s denied.
(Trial Tr., p.265, Ls.9-20) (emphasis added). Despite the district court’s ruling which included a
warning to the prosecutor to be sure not to mention the revocation of consent, the prosecutor told
the jury that Mr. Reed sought to stop the search of his van by revoking his consent.
D.

The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied Mr. Reed’s Motion For
A Mistrial
As previously discussed, the question on appeal is “whether the event which precipitated

the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full
record.” Field, 144 Idaho at 571. The appellate court’s focus “is upon the continuing impact on
the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible
error.” Id.
Here, the continuing impact of the prosecutorial misconduct suggests the district court
committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Reed’s motion for a mistrial. In this case, the
error was clearly prejudicial. As the prosecutor said during the hearing prior to the start of trial,
his only proof that Mr. Reed knew there was methamphetamine in the car was his revocation of
consent:
“His original consent to search the vehicle and then his anger afterwards when he
saw Officer Caldwell starting to find something is exactly more probative than I
have anything else in this case [to show] that the defendant knew there were drugs
in his car. . . and it makes sense that if the officer’s in the car and the defendant
gets angry, and Officer Caldwell, then, has a suspicion that there’s drugs in the
car because of the defendant’s reaction, then he calls a drug dog.”
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(Trial Tr., p.160, Ls.7-17.) The statement was made during closing arguments, so it was one of
the last things the jury heard; further, in order to preserve the error, defense counsel had to object
to the comment, which only served to highlight the issue to the jury.
Thus, the district court’s denial of Mr. Reed’s motion for a mistrial, when viewed in the
context of the full record, constituted reversible error. The judgment of conviction should be
vacated, and the case should be remanded to the district court for a new trial.
IV.
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Arguments
A.

Introduction
Mr. Reed asserts that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, was violated when the prosecutor, in closing
arguments, denigrated the defense and presented an argument known to be untrue in an attempt
to impugn Mr. Reed’s character, and misrepresented the law.

Mr. Reed asserts that the

prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument, rising to the level of a fundamental
error, when he used inflammatory language calculated to appeal to the passions and prejudices of
the jury, and misstated the arguments raised by defense counsel during the course of closing
arguments by implying that Mr. Reed was faking his injuries in an attempt to gain the jury’s
sympathy. Because the prosecutor knew the injuries were real—he had information from the
officers at the scene’s audio recordings which supported Mr. Reed’s testimony regarding his
disabilities/injuries—the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence to the jury.
B.

Standard Of Review
A conviction will be set aside for unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct only if the

misconduct is sufficiently egregious to constitute fundamental error. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho
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132, 141 (2014). To prove an error is fundamental, a defendant bears the burden of proving:
(1) the error violated one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error
is obvious from the existing record; and (3) the error was not harmless. Id.; State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 226 (2010). If a defendant demonstrates one of his unwaived constitutional rights
was plainly violated, this Court applies the harmless error test to determine whether the
defendant has shown there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the outcome of the trial.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. If so, the conviction is vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
Id. at 228.
C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Closing Arguments
“[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. This notion—basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society—is a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of ‘due
process.’” Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Due process requires criminal
trials to be fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial
misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318
(Ct. App. 2005). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct
must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219
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(1982). The aim of due process is not the punishment of society for the misdeeds of the
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Id.
Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they
will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, ___, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903). The
prosecutor’s duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent
evidence and he should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id., 71 P. at
611. The prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences.
Id., 71 P. at 611. “Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the
law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. This can occur where the
prosecutor employs inflammatory language regarding the defendant or defense counsel,
particularly where that language is “seemingly calculated to arouse negative emotions” on the
part of the jury towards the defendant. See State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007);
see also State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 19 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 657
(Ct. App. 1985).
“Indeed, the prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the facts and
unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.”

State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014) (internal

punctuation marks omitted). “Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use
of inflammatory tactics are impermissible.” State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20 (Ct. App. 2008).
Misrepresentations or diminishments of the State’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond
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a reasonable doubt are impermissible. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1993); Phillips,
144 Idaho at 87. “It is improper to misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in closing
argument.” Moses, 156 Idaho at 871 (quoting State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 133 (Ct. App.
2013)). Likewise, it impacts upon a defendant’s right to a fair trial if a prosecutor misstates or
misrepresents the evidence, or seeks to distort the defense presented at trial.

See State v.

Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 909-10 (2010); State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 575-76 (Ct. App.
2007).
It is misconduct for the prosecution to make personal attacks on defense counsel in
closing argument. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003); United States v. Young, 470
U.S. 1, 9 & n. 7 (1985). Closing argument should not mock or include disparaging comments
about opposing counsel. Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280; State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000);
State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 290 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding closing argument should not
include disparaging comments about opposing counsel’s argument).
In Sheahan, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's comments during closing
argument that defense counsel had misled and lied to the jury were improper. 139 Idaho at 280.
The Court held that the comments appeared to have been made with the goal of inflaming the
minds of the jurors and arousing passion or prejudice against the defendant based upon the
asserted misconduct of defense counsel. Id. at 281.
1.

The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct When It Argued To The Jury
Information Specifically Prohibited By The District Court’s Prior Ruling

Mr. Reed asserts the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when it told the jury that
Mr. Reed objected during the search of his van, because the State thereby violated the district
court’s order precluding the introduction of such evidence. Defense counsel objected when the
prosecutor first mentioned it to the jury, and the State will be unable to show such error was
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harmless. Alternatively, the second time the prosecutor told the jurors that Mr. Reed objected to
the search of his van, no objection was made; however, such constituted fundamental error.
As discussed in Section III(C), which argument Mr. Reed incorporates herein, Idaho’s
appellate courts have held, “[v]iolation of a district court order governing the presentation of
evidence may constitute misconduct.” State v. Herrera, 159 Idaho at 623-24 (2015).
Here, Mr. Reed moved to preclude the State from offering evidence relating to
Mr. Reed’s revocation of consent to search the van. (Trial Tr., p.151, L.8 – p.152, L.6.) The
district court granted the motion, ruling that “the State cannot ask about the revocation of
consent” or “make the argument that revocation of consent shows consciousness of guilt or
knowledge.” (Trial Tr., p.164, Ls.10-13.) However, during the trial, the prosecutor told the jury
during his closing arguments that Mr. Reed tried to stop the officers from searching his van,
“Here we have somebody who owns the van, who tries to stop the officers from searching his
vehicle only after they started it.” (Trial Tr., p.265, Ls.9-12.) This first improper reference to
Mr. Reed’s invocation of his Fourth Amendment rights was discussed in Part II.
The prosecutor then did it again, this time saying in rebuttal closing, “He’s the one who
objected to officers searching his -- or to -- started getting frustrated.” (Trial Tr., p.276, Ls.8-9.)
The State made these comments despite the district court’s order precluding the introduction of
evidence of Mr. Reed’s revocation of his consent to search the van, and despite the fact that it
was lucky to have avoided a mistrial the first time it violated the court’s order. (See Trial
Tr., p.164, L.10 – p.165, L.5.)
The prosecutor, by telling the jury that Mr. Reed objected to the officers searching his
van, revealed to the jury that Mr. Reed revoked his earlier consent.

This was argument

prohibited by the district court in its earlier ruling. By violating that order, the State committed
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prosecutorial misconduct.

See, e.g., Field, 144 Idaho at 572; Erickson, 148 Idaho at 684;

Herrera, 159 Idaho at 623-24 (vacating Mr. Herrera’s conviction where the State, in violation of
the district court’s order, “asked questions that appeared to be deliberately designed to elicit the
exact testimony that the district court had specifically prohibited,” and holding “[a] party’s
deliberate violation of an order excluding evidence with little relevance but with great potential
for prejudice is an attack on the fairness of the proceeding and cannot be countenanced”).
2.

The State Committed Misconduct When, During Its Closing Arguments, The
Prosecutor Implied That Mr. Reed And His Counsel Were Feigning Mr. Reed’s
Disability In Order To Garner Sympathy From The Jury

In closing argument, the State repeatedly implied that Mr. Reed and his counsel were
falsely telling the jurors that he was disabled.

Defense counsel did not object to any of the

prosecutor’s statements; however, Mr. Reed can show the misconduct constituted fundamental
error.
The State committed misconduct by appealing to the sympathies of the jury and by
disparaging the defendant as well as the defense theory.
Remember my picture of Lady Justice? We’re blind to sympathy. That’s what
the defense has given you today, really, a sympathy case. Please feel so sorry for
the defendant that you acquit. He has all these health problems. He has his cane
that Mr. Beus even stood up after the defendant walked halfway to the stand and
was like, do you need this? Oh no, I’m okay.
(Trial Tr., p.275, L.21 – p.276, L.2.) The prosecutor’s comments denigrated the defense as just a
bid for sympathy.
The prosecutor’s baseless implication that Mr. Reed was faking his disability constituted
prosecutorial misconduct. An assertion that defense counsel and Mr. Reed had orchestrated the
appearance of physical injury impugned the defense. However, this assertion is contradicted by
the evidence—the prosecutor was well aware of the audio recordings of Officers Caldwell and

45

Smotherman (State’s Exhs. 1, 3) which were admitted at the suppression hearing. They reveal
that Mr. Reed repeatedly explained to the officers why he was not wearing a shoe—due to
neuropathy of his foot—and his inability to get back up, should the officers require him to sit
down on the ground. (State’s Exh. 3, 7:36-7:42.) The audio recording reflects the officer(s)
acquiescing to allow Mr. Reed to hobble over to lean against the other vehicle during his 40minute detention.

(State’s Exh. 3, 7:06-9:50.)

Finally, Officer Caldwell even testified to

Mr. Reed’s disability during the suppression hearing, “I think he was leaning against the white
Jeep because he had something wrong with his foot, so he couldn’t put a lot of pressure on it.”
(Trial Tr., p.23, Ls.2-6.) For the prosecutor to tell the jury that he believed Mr. Reed was lying
about being disabled is disingenuous, and a misrepresentation of the evidence. See State v.
Tupis, 112 Idaho 767, 772 (Ct. App. 1987) (“It is generally recognized as improper for a
prosecutor to make misstatements of the evidence during argument.”)
D.

The Prosecutor’s Misconduct Constitutes Fundamental Error Requiring This Court To
Vacate Mr. Reed’s Conviction
Mr. Reed did not object to the prosecutor’s improper arguments; however, he asserts that

the prosecutor’s arguments amount to fundamental error necessitating this Court to vacate his
conviction. Mr. Reed can meet the fundamental error inquiry set forth in Perry where the errors
violated his unwaived constitutional rights, plainly exist, and are not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho
at 227-28.
1.

By Arguing That The Jurors Should Find Mr. Reed Guilty Of Possession Of
Methamphetamine Because He Tried To Stop The Search Of His Van And By
Falsely Impugning The Defense As Trying To Obtain The Jury’s Sympathy, The
Prosecutor Attempted To Secure A Guilty Verdict By Improper Means, Thus
Violating Mr. Reed’s Fourteenth Amendment Right To A Fair Trial

The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that “the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
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fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970). “Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as
set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
In order to find Mr. Reed guilty of possession of methamphetamine, the jury had to find
the State proved that Mr. Reed knew there was methamphetamine in his van. (R., pp.150-51.)
By telling the jury that Mr. Reed’s exercise of his Fourth Amendment right to refuse to consent
to a search of his van was evidence of his guilt, the violated Mr. Reed’s constitutional right.
Where the prosecutor repeatedly impugned the defense by claiming Mr. Reed was faking his
physical disabilities, despite knowing that the disabilities were supported by other evidence that
was not introduced at trial, the State violated Mr. Reed’s right to put on a defense and
Mr. Reed’s due process right to a fair trial.
2.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Plain On Its Face

The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to
believe that Mr. Reed’s counsel was “sandbagging” the district court by failing to object to the
prosecutor’s telling the jury that Mr. Reed tried to stop the search of his van because he knew
there was methamphetamine under the front seat—when counsel had previously objected and
moved for a mistrial—and by failing to object to the prosecutor’s arguments maligning the
defense by implying Mr. Reed’s disability was feigned as a bid for the jury’s sympathy, when in
fact the prosecutor knew the disability to be real. The elements the State must prove in order for
the jury to convict a defendant of possession of methamphetamine are well-established. See
Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789, 792 (Ct. App. 2007). There is simply no strategic advantage
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that can possibly be gained by allowing the prosecutor to tell the jury that Mr. Reed tried to stop
the search of his van because he knew there was methamphetamine under the seat and allowing it
to impugn the defense despite knowing Mr. Reed was actually disabled.

Therefore, the

prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face.
3.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Not Harmless

Because Mr. Reed did not object to the prosecutorial misconduct during trial, he bears
“the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the
trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Mr. Reed asserts that there is a reasonable possibility that the
prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome of his trial.
Whether Mr. Reed knew the methamphetamine was under his seat was the central issue
for the jury to decide. It is quite possible that the jurors believed that Mr. Reed’s agitation and
revocation of consent to search once he realized law enforcement intended to conduct a search of
even the glove compartment was evidence of guilt. It is also quite possible that the jurors
believed the prosecutor’s argument that Mr. Reed was lying about his disabilities and therefore,
neither he nor his defense could be trusted, such as to whether Mr. Reed knew there was
methamphetamine under the van’s driver’s seat. In sum, there is a reasonable possibility that the
jurors were persuaded that Mr. Reed testified falsely about his disabilities and his knowledge of
the methamphetamine, and his revocation of consent was really an acknowledgment of guilt, and
a reasonable possibility that, had they required the State to carry its burden to prove knowledge,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct
in this case was not harmless.
The Court should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Reed his right to a fair trial
because it cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that misconduct did not contribute to the
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verdict. In reviewing the trial as a whole, the prosecutor’s improper comments, constituting
misconduct, likely influenced the jury.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Reed respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
Alternatively, Mr. Reed requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction.
DATED this 5th day of April, 2018.

_________/s/________________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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